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Fairness and Channel Coordination
Abstract

In this paper, we incorporate the concept of fairness in a conventional dyadic channel
to investigate how fairness may a®ect channel coordination. We show that when channel members are concerned about fairness, the manufacturer can use a simple wholesale
price above its marginal cost to coordinate this channel both in terms of achieving the
maximum channel pro¯t and in terms of attaining the maximum channel utility. Thus,
channel coordination may not require an elaborate pricing contract. A constant wholesale price will do.
(Keyword: Distribution Channels; Fairness; Channel Coordination; Behavioral Economics)

\Even pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms will have an incentive to act in a manner that is perceived
as fair if the individuals with whom they deal are willing to resist unfair transactions
and punish unfair ¯rms at some cost to themselves...willingness to enforce fairness is
common."
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler (1986)
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Introduction

Our objective in this paper is to examine how ¯rms' concerns about fairness a®ect the nature of
optimal contracts in a marketing channel. There are two main motivations for us to take this initial
step. First, research in behavioral economics in the past two decades has shown that \there is a
signi¯cant incidence of cases in which ¯rms, like individuals, are motivated by concerns of fairness" in business relationships, including channel relationships (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler
1986). Studies in economics and marketing have long documented many cases where fairness plays
an important role in developing and maintaining channel relationships (Okun 1981; Frazier 1983;
Heide and John 1988,1992; Kaufmann and Stern 1988; Anderson and Weitz 1992; Hackett 1994;
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1998; Corsten and Kumar 2003,2005). For instance, through a
large scale survey of car dealerships in the US and Netherlands, Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp
(1995) show convincingly that fairness is a signi¯cant determinant of the quality of channel relationships. Subsequent research has also documented many cases where both manufacturers and
retailers sacri¯ce their own margins for the bene¯t of their counterpart because of fairness concerns
(Olmstead and Rhode 1985; Kumar 1996; Scheer, Kumar, and Steenkamp 2003). Indeed, some
practitioners go as far as to say that maintaining fairness in a distribution channel \should be the
supplier's ¯rst concern"(McCarthy 1985). Therefore, fairness concerns are a factor that analytical
modelers in marketing may not want to ignore as they strive to develop good descriptive models
of channel coordination. Analytical models on channel coordination in the past typically assume
that all channel members care only about their monetary payo®s. This focus on monetary payo®s has produced many well-known conclusions. For instance, in a conventional dyadic channel
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consisting of one manufacturer selling a product to a single retailer at a constant wholesale price,
using a price that does not vary with the quantity of purchase results in the well-known problem of
\double marginalization" and the channel pro¯t is always sub-optimal. A creative remedy for this
problem is for the manufacturer to use quantity discounts (Jeuland and Shugan 1983). Moorthy
(1987) shows carefully that other non-linear pricing contracts, such as a two-part tari®, can also
coordinate the dyadic channel. However, it is not known if these managerial prescriptions apply
to a channel where some or all channel members care about monetary payo®s as well as fairness.
It is also unknown if new managerial prescriptions are required when the channel members are
fair-minded.
Second, as noted some time ago by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), incentive contracts in the
real world frequently take simpler forms than what theory often predicts. This can happen because,
aside from the cost of writing and implementing an intricate contract, a simple contract may be the
optimal one in \a richer real world environment." This can also happen because ¯rms have little to
lose using a simpler contract (Raju and Srinivasan 1996). In a channel context, we also observe in
some cases that channel transactions are \governed by simple contracts de¯ned only by a per unit
wholesale price" (Lariviere and Porteus 2001). Of course, in some cases, channel contracts may
only appear simple because the complexity is absorbed by trade promotions and various allowances.
However, we believe intriguing to investigate whether the simplicity of the channel contract may
also be due to \a richer real world environment" where channel members care about fairness in
their transactions.
Past theoretical models have devoted considerable attention to channel issues. McGuire and
Staelin (1983), Coughlan (1985), and Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989), for instance, examine the
manufacturers' choice of channel structure. Gerstner and Hess (1995) investigate the channel
coordination role of pull promotions and Weng (1995) examines that of quantity discounts from an
operations management perspective, all in the context of a dyadic channel. Chu and Desai (1995),
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Desai and Srinivasan (1995), and Desai (1997) study the mechanisms for channel coordination to
achieve customer satisfaction and to align the interests of the franchisor and franchisees in the
context of demand uncertainty and heterogeneity. Ingene and Parry (1995a; 1995b; 2000) and
Iyer (1998) study channel coordination in a competitive context. More recently, Ho and Zhang
(2004) use a reference-dependent approach to study double-marginalization problem in a dyadic
channel. We attempt to contribute to this growing body of literature by examining the implications
of fairness in a channel context.
As a ¯rst step, we shall start with the simplest channel structure|the dyadic channel, and
introduce distributive fairness in a parsimonious, tractable way as inequity aversion. The history of
the intellectual discourse on distributive fairness can be traced to Plato's Republic and Aristotle's
Nichomachean Ethics (Cohen 1987). In modern times, Adams (1965) saw the relevance of distributive fairness in commercial relationships. Concerns of distributive fairness are not just limited to
individuals as economic agents. Researchers in sociology, marketing, psychology, and other disciplines have found that distributive fairness can play an important role in ¯rms' transactions with
each other. This is because, as Macneil (1980) argues in advancing a long intellectual tradition
(Adams 1963; Adams and Freedman 1976; and Blumstein and Weinstein 1969), the norm of mutuality between parties (e.g., partnering ¯rms) in contracts requires some kind of \evenness" that
assures adequate returns to each instead of requiring strict equality when dividing the exchange
surplus. This view of commercial relationships is apparently quite in°uential in marketing as well,
as discussed previously.1
We ¯rst analyze a model where the retailer is fair-minded. Then, we extend our analysis to
the case where, instead of merely reacting to the retailer's fairness concerns, the manufacturer also
1
In more recent years, another intellectual tradition has also joined the force to highlight the importance of fairness
in commercial relationships. The famous Ultimatum Game developed by GÄ
uth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982)
has been repeated in numerous experiments in various settings. Subjects in those experiments, including executive
and full-time MBAs, have demonstrated a strong sense of fairness. In other lab experiments, researchers also ¯nd
that subjects are averse to both disadvantageous and advantageous inequality between themselves and their partners
(Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman 1989; Hackett 1994).
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cares about fairness. For ease of exposition, we de¯ne a channel where one or more of its members
cares about fairness as a \fair channel".
Our analysis shows that the manufacturer can use a constant wholesale price to align the
retailer's interest with the channel's and coordinate the channel with a wholesale price higher than
its marginal cost. Said di®erently, the double marginalization problem does not always arise when
the manufacturer uses a simple pricing contract. Through careful analysis, we also identify the
mechanism through which a simple wholesale price coordinates the channel. In this regard, we ¯nd
that the intuition gained from studying a conventional channel where only monetary payo®s matter
does not necessarily carry over to the case where channel members care about fairness and indeed,
a simpler contract can be optimal in a richer channel environment.

2

Constant Wholesale Price and Channel Coordination

Consider the standard dyadic channel where a single manufacturer sells its product to consumers
through a single retailer. For our basic model, we assume that the manufacturer moves ¯rst2 and
charges a constant wholesale price w. Then, taking the wholesale price w as given, the retailer sets
its price p. For simplicity, we assume that only the manufacturer incurs a unit production cost
c > 0 in this channel,3 and the market demand is given by D(p) = a ¡ bp, where b > 0. This
demand speci¯cation abstracts away from the issues related to consumer fairness concerns about
price changes motivated by \fair reasons" (cost factors) vs. \unfair reasons" (demand factors).
We will come back to these issues in the conclusion section. The maximally achievable pro¯t for
the whole channel is given by ¦c (p¤ ) = (p¤ ¡ c)D(p¤ ) at the channel coordinating retail price
p¤ = argmax ¦c (p) =

a+bc
2b .

It is well-known that as long as all channel members care only about

their own monetary payo®s, the manufacturer cannot achieve the maximum channel pro¯t with
only a constant wholesale price (Jeuland and Shugan 1983). In that case, as illustrated in Figure 1,
2

This assumption is innocuous and we come to the same conclusions if we relax this assumption and allow the
two channel members to bargain over the wholesale price. Please see Cui (2005).
3
Here, c is known to the retailer. Although this assumption is limiting, there exist industries, as we will argue in
the conclusion, where the cost information is transparent to the retailer.
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the manufacturer will optimally choose to set its wholesale price at w
~ > c, which will then induce
the retailer to charge a price higher than p¤ to maximize its own pro¯t, leaving the channel pro¯t
suboptimal.

Π*c
~

Channel profit (Π c )

~

Manufacturer’s profit (Π)
Retailer’s profit (π~)

~
Πc

π~

~=
w* = w

a + bc
2b

w
a
b

Figure 1: Pro¯ts in Conventional Channel

When the retailer also cares about fairness, besides its pro¯tability, it will maximize a utility
function u(w; p) that accounts for the retailer's monetary payo® as well as its concern about fairness
when setting its price. Later we shall analyze the case where both manufacturer and retailer care
about fairness. In general, we can write
u(w; p) = ¼(w; p) + fr (w; p);

(2.1)

i.e. that the monetary payo® ¼(w; p) = (p ¡ w)D(p) and the disutility due to inequity fr (w; p)
enter the retailer's utility function in an additive form4 . We can model fairness as inequity aversion
a la Fehr and Schmidt (1999), such that the retailer is willing to \give up some monetary payo® to
μ
move in the direction of more equitable outcomes."
4

To see that this expression is quite general, let player i's utility be given by Ui (x) = 'i (x; ¦i (x)), where x
is the vector of all n players' decisions fx1 ; :::; xn g and ¦i (x) is player i's monetary payo®. This utility function
is equivalent to Ui (x) = ¦i (x) + 'i (x; ¦i (x)) ¡ ¦i (x). If we denote 'i (x; ¦i (x)) ¡ ¦i (x) as fi (x), then we have
Ui (x) = ¦i (x) + fi (x) as in the text.
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We assume that the equitable outcome for the retailer is ° times the manufacturer's payo®,
or °¦(w; p), where ¦(w; p) = (w ¡ c)D(p). In other words, the retailer's equitable payo® is the
payo® it deems deserving relative to the manufacturer's payo®. This speci¯cation of the retailer's
equitable payo® is also consistent with the past literature on distributive fairness (see Macneil
1980 and Frazier 1983). Here, ° > 0 broadly captures the channel members' contributions and
is exogenous to our model. Presumably, each channel member's equitable payo®s depend on the
best outside option available to each. For instance, if the retailer's outside option improves relative
to the manufacturer's, ° is expected to increase, and vice versa. In addition, anything that may
a®ect a channel member's relative contribution in the channel, either due to demand-side factors
or supply-side factors, should also a®ect °. For instance, ° can increase if the retailer's marginal
costs decrease or the retailer helps the manufacturer to lower its marginal costs.5
Thus, if the retailer's monetary payo® is lower than the equitable payo®, a disadvantageous
inequality occurs, which will result in a disutility for the retailer in the amount of ® per unit di®erence in the two payo®s. If its monetary payo® is higher than the equitable payo®, an advantageous
inequality occurs in the amount of ¯ per unit di®erence in the payo®s. Algebraically, we have
fr (w; p) = ¡® maxf°¦(w; p) ¡ ¼(w; p); 0g ¡ ¯ maxf¼(w; p) ¡ °¦(w; p); 0g:

(2.2)

Such inequity aversion will motivate the retailer to reduce the disutility from inequity, whichever
form it may take, even if the action reduces the retailer's monetary payo®. Past research has shown
that \subjects su®er more from inequity that is to their monetary disadvantage than from inequity
that is to their monetary advantage" (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Accordingly, we further assume
¯ · ® and 0 < ¯ < 1. In Table 1, we summarize our model notations for the ease of reference.
Here, it is appropriate to note that the utility function speci¯ed in Equation (2.2), analogous to
the common practice in the economics literature of specifying a utility function for a group of people
or for a society, helps us to capture the retailer's concerns for fairness in a succinct way. The retailer
5

We thank an anonymous reviewer and the AE for making these suggestions.
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only behaves as if it has such a utility function. It is also worth noting that distributive fairness
has much more substance than a simple mathematic representation here can capture. Nevertheless,
we believe that this formulation strikes a reasonable balance between modeling tractability and
behavioral complexity.
Table 1: Variable De¯nitions
Notation

De¯nition

c

manufacturer's marginal production cost
retail price, wholesale price, and manufacturer-charged °at fee
market demand, b > 0
pro¯t functions respectively for retailer, manufacturer and channel
utility functions for retailer and manufacturer
disutility functions for retailer and manufacturer due to inequity
retailer's and manufacturer's disadvantageous inequality parameters
retailer's and manufacturer's advantageous inequality parameters
retailer's and manufacturer's equitable payo® parameters
channel-coordinating retail price, p¤ = a+bc
2b

p, w, F
D(p) = a ¡ bp
¼; ¦; ¦c
u; U
fr ; fm

®; ®0
¯; ¯0
°; ¹
p¤

2.1

Retailer's Decisions

Given any wholesale price w, the retailer will choose a retail price p to maximize its utility given
by equations (2.1) and (2.2). As the utility function is not di®erentiable everywhere, we derive the
retailer's optimal decision in two steps. First, we derive the retailer's optimal decision conditional
on the retailer's monetary payo® being either lower or higher than its equitable payo®. In the
former case, i.e. ¼(w; p) ¡ °¦(w; p) = (p ¡ w)D(p) ¡ °(w ¡ c)D(p) · 0, the retailer experiences
disadvantageous inequality. In the latter case, i.e. ¼(w; p)¡°¦(w; p) = (p¡w)D(p)¡°(w¡c)D(p) ¸
0, the retailer experiences advantageous inequality. Second, the optimal solutions from both cases
are compared to determine the retailer's global optimal solution.
When the retailer e®ects disadvantageous inequality, ¼(w; p) ¡ °¦(w; p) = (p ¡ w)D(p) ¡ °(w ¡
c)D(p) · 0 or equivalently p · (1 + °)w ¡ °c, the retailer's optimization problem is given below
maxp (p ¡ w)(a ¡ bp) ¡ ®[°(w ¡ c) ¡ (p ¡ w)](a ¡ bp);
7

(2.3)

p · (1 + °)w ¡ °c:

s:t:

(2.4)

The optimal price and the maximum utility for the retailer, conditional on disadvantageous inequality, are given below
p1 =
where w1 =

a+a®+b®°c+2b°c
b(1+®+®°+2°) .

u1 =

(

(a+bw)(1+®)+®b°(w¡c)
2b(1+®)

(1 + °)w ¡ °c

if w > w1
if otherwise

(2.5)

The retailer's utility is given by
(

[(a¡bw)(1+®)¡®b°(w¡c)]2
4b(1+®)

if w > w1
°(w ¡ c)[a ¡ bw ¡ b°(w ¡ c)] if otherwise.

(2.6)

Similarly, if the retailer's pricing decision results in advantageous inequality, its monetary payo®
is no lower than its equitable payo®, or ¼(w; p) ¡ °¦(w; p) = (p ¡ w)D(p) ¡ °(w ¡ c)D(p) ¸ 0. The
retailer's optimization problem becomes
maxp (p ¡ w)(a ¡ bp) ¡ ¯[(p ¡ w) ¡ °(w ¡ c)](a ¡ bp)
s:t:

p ¸ (1 + °)w ¡ °c:

(2.7)
(2.8)

De¯ne
p¹2 =

(a + bw)(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ ¯b°(w ¡ c)
a ¡ a¯ ¡ ¯b°c + 2b°c
; and w2 =
2b(1 ¡ ¯)
b(1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ¯° + 2°)

(2.9)

The retailer's optimal price and the maximum utility in the case of advantageous inequality are
given by
p2 =

(

p¹2
if w · w2
(1 + °)w ¡ °c if w > w2

u2 =

(

[(a¡bw)(1¡¯)+¯b°(w¡c)]2
4b(1¡¯)

if w · w2
°(w ¡ c)[a ¡ bw ¡ b°(w ¡ c)] if w > w2 :

(2.10)

As the retailer is in a position to cause either advantageous or disadvantageous inequality, it
will choose in a way to maximize its utility. The retailer's optimal decision will depend on whether
u1 in equation (2.6) is larger than u2 in equation (2.10). It can be shown that w1 > w2 always
holds and thus we have
8
< u1 · u2
:

u1 = u2
u1 > u2

if w · w2
if w2 < w · w1
if w > w1
8

(2.11)

This means that for any given w, the retailer's optimal price is given by

p(w) =

8
a+bw
>
>
> 2b ¡
>
>
>
<

¯°(w¡c)
2(1¡¯)

w + °(w ¡ c)

>
>
>
>
>
>
: a+bw
2b

+

if w · w2
if w2 < w · w1 :

®°(w¡c)
2(1+®)

(2.12)

if w > w1

Equation (2.12) reveals something interesting about how the fair-minded retailer makes its
pricing decision. At any given w, the price that maximizes the retailer's monetary payo® is given
by p~ =

a+bw
2b ,

which is also the optimal price for the retailer if it does not care about fairness.

However, because of its fairness concern, the retailer will set a price below p~ in response to the
manufacturer setting a very low wholesale price (w · w2 ). In this case, the prospect of advantageous
inequality prompts the retailer to sacri¯ce its own monetary payo® to reward the manufacturer.
In contrast, when the manufacturer charges a very high wholesale price (w > w1 ), the retailer
faces the prospect of disadvantageous inequality if it were to set a price for pro¯t maximization.
In this case, the retailer charges a price higher than p~ and sacri¯ces its own monetary payo® to
punish the manufacturer. When the manufacturer sets an intermediate wholesale price, the retailer
will respond by setting a price that achieves the equitable outcome: neither advantageous nor
disadvantageous inequality will occur.

2.2

Manufacturer's Decisions

For now we assume that the manufacturer sets its wholesale price w only to maximize its pro¯t
¦(w) = (w ¡ c)[a ¡ bp(w)] in anticipation of the retailer's reactions through p(w) given in equation
(2.12). This assumption allows us to develop some intuition about how fairness shapes channel
interactions in a parsimonious manner. We will extend our analysis in Section 3 to the case where
the manufacturer also cares about fairness. We simply note here that this extension will not alter
our main conclusions, but will yield some additional insights.
Our analysis of the manufacturer's decisions is similar to that for the retailer, proceeding in
two steps. First, we determine the most pro¯table wholesale price for the manufacturer in each

9

Π c = Π *c
Channel profit (Π c)
Manufacturer’s profit (Π)
Retailer’s profit (π)
Channel utility (Π + u)
Retailer’s utility (u )

w* = wII

w=

w

a + aα + bcαγ
b(1 + α + αγ )

a
b

Figure 2: Equilibrium for Fair Channel
of the three price ranges indicated in equation (2.12). Second, we compare the resulting payo®s
to determine the globally optimal payo® for the manufacturer. For brevity, we leave the detailed
derivations in Technical Appendix A and summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The manufacturer can coordinate the fair channel, both in terms of achieving the
maximum channel pro¯tability and in terms of attaining the maximum channel utility, with a
constant wholesale price w if the retailer is su±ciently inequity averse ( ® ¸ max f °¡1
1+° ; ¯g and
¯ ¸

1
1+° ).

The manufacturer achieves channel coordination by setting a wholesale price higher

than its marginal cost (w¤ =

a+bc+2b°c
2b(1+°) )

and obtains a payo® of ¦¤ =

response, its price at p¤ and gets a payo® of ¼ ¤ = u¤ =

(a¡bc)2
4b(1+°) .

The retailer sets, in

(a¡bc)2 °
4b(1+°) .

Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. From Figure 2, we see that fairness concerns on the part
of the retailer has introduced considerable nonlinearity in each channel member's payo® function
and hence into the payo® function for the whole channel, as compared to the payo® functions for
the conventional channel (Figure 1) where fairness concerns are absent. Yet, in equilibrium, the
manufacturer's one stone{its wholesale price{kills three \birds."6 The wholesale price that the
6

In Figure 2, the channel coordinating conditions ® ¸ max f °¡1
1+° ; ¯g and ¯ ¸

10

1
1+°

are satis¯ed.

manufacturer chooses to maximize its own pro¯tability also maximizes the retailer's utility, the
channel's pro¯tability, and the channel's total utility de¯ned as the sum of the retailer's utility and
manufacturer's pro¯ts. In other words, the manufacturer's wholesale price can align all channel
members' incentives to the bene¯t of the channel as a whole such that the double marginalization
problem does not occur.
Intuitively, the retailer's concern with fairness introduces two unexpected opportunities for channel coordination. First, inequity aversion on the part of the retailer can exacerbate the problem
of double-marginalization, as the retailer may mark-up its price excessively to punish the manufacturer for setting an \unfairly" high wholesale price. However, it can also alleviate the problem
when the retailer sacri¯ces its own margin to reward the manufacturer for a \generous" wholesale
price. Under the right condition (e.g., ¯ =

1
1+° ),

the manufacturer can be motivated by the reward

to charge a wholesale price that is su±ciently low, but still above its marginal cost (w = w2 = w¤ )
to coordinate the channel. Second, when the manufacturer charges some intermediate wholesale
price (w2 < w · w1 ), the fair-minded retailer is better o® e®ecting an equitable outcome where
neither advantageous nor disadvantageous inequality occurs and achieving a payo® of °¦. As a
result, the fair-minded retailer voluntarily aligns its interest with the manufacturer's. In this case,
as the manufacturer sets its wholesale price at w¤ to maximize its pro¯t ¦, it also maximizes the
retailer's utility and payo® °¦ as well as the channel pro¯t and utility (1 + °)¦.
Note that when the channel is coordinated, the manufacturer's wholesale price is above its
marginal cost. Furthermore, relative to the optimal wholesale price in the corresponding decentralized channel absent of any fairness concerns, i.e. w =

a
2b

+ 2c , the manufacturer's wholesale price in

this fair channel is lower, weighing less heavily on the demand factors ( ab ), but more on marginal
cost (c). Thus, Proposition 1 also suggests that the retailer's fairness concerns have a tendency to
depress a channel's wholesale price while encouraging more cost-based pricing.
The main signi¯cance of Proposition 1 lies, however, in the observation that channel coordina-

11

tion may not require a very elaborate pricing contract. A constant wholesale price will do, as long
as the retailer is fair-minded. This implies that when one observes a constant wholesale price in
a channel, it is not an indication that the manufacturer lacks interest in channel coordination or
that it may be using some other complex but undisclosed pricing contract. Indeed, a manufacturer
may even have a good reason to prefer this simple pricing mechanism, as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 When a fair channel is coordinated through a constant wholesale price, the retailer
perceives no inequity. Therefore, a constant wholesale price as a channel coordination mechanism
can help to foster an equitable channel relationship.
Proposition 2 thus uncovers the lure of a constant wholesale price as a possible pricing in
distribution channels. It also highlights the importance of an equitable distribution of channel
pro¯ts in channel management.

3

Fair-Minded Manufacturer and Retailer

The analysis we have conducted so far is in the spirit of examining whether \pro¯t maximizing-¯rms
will have an incentive to act in a manner that is perceived as fair if the individuals with whom they
deal are willing to resist unfair transactions and punish unfair ¯rms at some cost to themselves"
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). What happens if the manufacturer is also fair-minded?
We address that question in this section.
When the manufacturer is also fair-minded, we assume that the manufacturer considers a payo®
of ¹¼ as the fair payo® to itself, where ¹ > 0 is a positive, exogenous parameter analogous to ° in our
basic model and ¼ is the retailer's monetary payo®. With its fairness concerns, the manufacturer no
longer strives to maximize only its monetary payo®. Its objective is to maximize its utility de¯ned
as
U (X; p) = ¦(X; p) + fm (X; p);

12

(3.1)

where X is the manufacturer's decision variable(s) and
fm (X; p) = ¡®0 maxf¹¼(X; p) ¡ ¦(X; p); 0g ¡ ¯0 maxf¦(X; p) ¡ ¹¼(X; p); 0g:
For the same reason as in our basic model, we assume ¯0 · ®0 and 0 · ¯0 < 1. Note that our basic
model is a special case of the extended model with ®0 = 0 and ¯0 = 0.
When both channel members care about fairness, channel interactions become more complex
and interesting.7 In this case, what they each consider as fair is an important barometer for
gauging the outcome of channel interactions. On the one hand, the retailer considers a payo® of °¦
as equitable. This means that the retailer considers

°
1+° ¦c

to be the equitable share of the channel

pro¯t for its participation in the channel. On the other hand, the manufacturer considers its own
equitable share to be

¹
1+¹ ¦c .

The sum of these two equitable shares is the minimum pro¯t that the

channel has to produce in order to satisfy both channel members' desire for an equitable outcome.
We refer to this minimum channel pro¯t as the Equity-Capable Channel Payo® (ECCP). We have
ECCP =

¹
¹° + ¹ + ° + ¹°
°
¦c +
¦c =
¦c :
1+°
1+¹
¹° + ¹ + ° + 1

(3.2)

In the case where ECCP > ¦c for a channel, or ¹° > 1, we shall refer to this channel as
the acrimonious channel. In this channel, the two channel members jointly desire more monetary
payo®s than what the channel is capable of producing and hence either upstream or downstream
inequity will result regardless of whether the channel is coordinated or how it is coordinated. In
the case where ECCP · ¦c or ¹° · 1, we shall refer to this channel as the harmonious channel.
For this channel, an equitable division of channel pro¯ts is feasible. We summarize our analysis of
the case where the manufacturer only uses a constant wholesale price in the following proposition.
7
If the manufacturer is the only fair-minded channel member, the resulting channel is closer to the case of the
conventional channel. As shown in Cui (2005), if only the manufacturer is fair-minded, the channel can never
be coordinated with a constant wholesale price as the double marginalization problem can never be removed. In
fact, depending on the magnitude of ¹, or what the manufacturer considers to be its equitable payo®, the double
marginalization problem may become less or more severe because of the manufacturer's fairness concerns. In other
words, the fair-minded manufacturer may not be a blessing to the channel if the manufacturer deems a very high
payo® as equitable(¹ > 2).
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Proposition 3 The manufacturer can use the wholesale price derived in Proposition 1 to coordinate an acrimonious channel, both in terms of maximizing the channel pro¯t and in terms of
attaining the maximum channel utility, as long as it is not too averse to its own disadvantageous
inequality or ®0 ·

1
¹°¡1 .

It can do the same to coordinate a harmonious channel as long as it is not

su±ciently averse to its own advantageous inequality, or ¯0 ·
and ¯0 < 1 if ¯ >

1
1+°

1
1+¹

if ¯ =

1
1+°

and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g

and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g.

The detailed analysis and proofs are contained in Technical Appendix B.
Intuitively, when charging a constant wholesale price to coordinate the channel, the manufacturer must rely, as we have discussed before, on the retailer's desire to e®ect an equitable outcome
to align the retailer's interest with the channel's. In turn, this means that the manufacturer must be
willing to make some sacri¯ce and bear any disadvantageous (advantageous) inequity when dealing
with the acrimonious (harmonious) channel, since the retailer must not bear any. That is why ®0
(¯0 ) must be su±ciently small when facing the acrimonious (harmonious) channel.
Propositions 3 suggests that an equitable channel relationship is harder to come by when all
channel members are averse to inequity. This outcome may seem counter-intuitive at ¯rst, but
it is quite plausible upon some re°ection. It captures the fact that it is harder to achieve equity
when each channel member views equity from their own parochial perspective. In e®ect, fairness
concerns can become a source of friction in channel relationships.

4

Conclusions

In this paper, we take an initial step to incorporate fairness concerns on the part of channel members
into analytical methods of channel coordination. Past studies in behavioral economics and in
marketing have shown that fairness is an important norm that often motivates and regulates channel
relationships, and that fairness concerns on the part of managers from time to time shape and govern
their on-going channel interactions. Therefore, it is useful to investigate fairness concerns and to
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explore their implications for channel coordination.
Our analysis shows that because of fairness concerns, the retailer has an incentive to e®ect
an equitable outcome in channel interactions, and channel coordination can be achieved using a
constant wholesale price. Said di®erently, in a fair channel, the problem of double marginalization
need not always be present and maximum channel pro¯t as well as the maximum channel utility
can be achieved by a self-interested manufacturer using a constant wholesale price.
Our analysis also shows that an equitable channel relationship may be an exception rather than
a norm, especially when all channel members are fair-minded (The range of parameters where the
channel is coordinated is smaller). In that case, con°icting fairness standards can be a source of
frictions in channel interactions and an inequitable division of channel pro¯ts can occur even when
the channel is coordinated achieving the maximum channel pro¯ts and utility. Thus, our normative
analysis puts in perspective the frictions and con°icts commonly observed in the channel context|
perhaps they are all the necessary evil associated with pursuing channel coordination!
At this point, curious readers may wonder whether nonlinear contracts such as a two-part
tari® or a quantity discount schedule can also coordinate the fair channel. Our analysis in Cui
(2005) suggests that they can. However, the manufacturer cannot use either mechanism to take
away all of the channel pro¯t. Indeed, the manufacturer may not be able to claim the largest
share of the channel pro¯t when the channel is so coordinated. In addition, such nonlinear pricing
contracts may not foster channel harmony as inequity inevitably occurs when they are used as
channel-coordinating mechanisms.
While we believe that our analysis has generated some useful new insights, it is important to
point out some important limitations of our model that future research can investigate further.
First, we take for granted that the concerns with fairness displayed by a ¯rm's managers are an
\automated," non-strategic behavior. Recent research in neuroeconomics has provided some initial
support for this view through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Results suggest that
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\when people feel they're been treated unfairly, a small area called the anterior insula lights up,
engendering the same disgust that people get from, say, smelling a skunk," while the prefrontal
cortex lights up when \people rationally weigh pros and cons" (BusinessWeek, 2005; and Camerer,
et al, 2005). However, it can be quite fruitful to look into the process through which such fairness
concerns may be formed and manifested in a channel context. Presumably, repeated interactions,
which we do not model here, may be conducive to their formation, through punishing any opportunistic behavior.
Second, we do not examine how imperfect information may a®ect channel interactions in the
presence of fairness concerns. For instance, a retailer may not know a manufacturer's costs to
know whether it has attained its equitable payo®s.8 Future research can investigate how robust our
conclusions are if such information related assumptions are relaxed. However, it is important to
note that in some industries, the retailer can get the manufacturer's cost information. Such is the
case, for instance, when the manufacturer supplies a standardized product or a commodity. In that
case, competitive o®ers from manufacturers will reveal to a retailer much cost information. Such is
also the case when the retailer engages in the private label business and therefore knows quite a bit
about manufacturers' cost structure. Furthermore, we venture to suggest that had the information
asymmetry in the channel been introduced, our conclusion would not have been a®ected in any
separating equilibrium where a high (low) cost is represented and believed to be a high (low) cost.
What this means is that information asymmetry may further restrict the parameter space but
should not qualitatively alter our conclusions.
Third, we analyzed a simple dyadic channel. More research is required to explore the implications of fairness in di®erent channel structures. Finally, our analysis focuses on the implications of
fairness concerns by channel players on channel coordination. For that reason, we do not model
consumer fairness concerns about price changes motivated by either \fair reasons" (cost factors)
or \unfair reasons" (Bolton, Warlop and Alba 2003). Future research can incorporate consumer
8

We thank an anonymous reviewer and the AE for raising this issue.
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fairness concerns to explore their implications for channel coordination.9

We suspect that since

the cost to the retailer is the wholesale price from the manufacturer, the double marginalization
problem could become worse, once incorporating consumer fairness concerns, as the retailer would
have a greater °exibility in marking up on the wholesale price due to the consumer fairness concerns. However, our conclusion should not be qualitatively a®ected. As we have shown, within a
certain wholesale price range, the retailer always wants to achieve the equitable outcome and it
does so by setting p(w) = w + °(w ¡ c). What this means is that the retailer's price will only
depend on the retailer's cost|the manufacturer's wholesale price. Therefore, the introduction of
consumer fairness concerns may not a®ect our conclusions qualitatively.
Notwithstanding these limitations, we hope that this initial step we have taken will sparkle
more interest in pursuing this exciting line of research in the future and motivate researchers to
investigate many other aspects of channels and issues that are a®ected by fairness concerns that
we were unable to address here.

9

We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
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Technical Appendix A
Proof of Manufacturer's Decisions for Constant Wholesale Price. When the manufacturer sets a wholesale price w, the retailer will choose p(w) as in equation (2.12). If the
manufacturer chooses a wholesale price from range w · w2 , then the manufacturer's optimization
problem is given by
maxw (w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp);
(

s:t:

p = a+bw
2b ¡
w · w2

(A1)

¯°(w¡c)
2(1¡¯)

(A2)

The optimal wholesale price and the manufacturer's pro¯t are given below1
w=

½

w
¹I
w2

if 0 < ¯ ·
otherwise

1¡2°
1+°

and

¦=

8
2
< (a¡bc) (1¡¯)
:

8b(1¡¯¡¯°)
(a¡bc)2 (1¡¯)°
b(1¡¯¡¯°+2°)2

if 0 < ¯ ·

1¡2°
1+°

otherwise

(A3)

where w
¹I = (a+bc)(1¡¯)¡2¯b°c
.
2b(1¡¯¡¯°)
If the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price from range w2 < w · w1 , then the manufacturer's
optimization problem is given by
maxw (w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp);

(A4)

8
>
< p = w + °(w ¡ c)

s:t:

(A5)

w>w

2
>
: w·w
1

The optimal wholesale price and the manufacturer's pro¯t are given below
w=

½

w2
w
¹II

if 0 < ¯ ·
otherwise

1
1+°

and

¦=

8
<

(a¡bc)2 (1¡¯)°
b(1¡¯¡¯°+2°)2
(a¡bc)2
4b(1+°)

:

if 0 < ¯ ·

1
1+°

otherwise

(A6)

where w
¹II = a+bc+2b°c
2b(1+°) .
If the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price from range w > w1 , then the manufacturer's
optimization problem is given by
maxw (w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp);
s:t:

(

a+bw
2b

p=
w > w1

+

(A7)

®°(w¡c)
2(1+®)

(A8)

The optimal wholesale price and the manufacturer's pro¯t are given below
w=

½

where w
¹III =
1

w
¹III
w1

if 0 < ® ·
otherwise

2°¡1
1+°

and

¦=

8
2
< (a¡bc) (1+®)
:

8b(1+®+®°)
(a¡bc)2 (1+®)°
b(1+®+®°+2°)2

(a+bc)(1+®)+2®b°c
.
2b(1+®+®°)

Note equation (A1) is not concave for some parametric values.
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if 0 < ® ·
otherwise

2°¡1
1+°

(A9)

Therefore, the manufacturer will compare the resulting payo®s to determine the globally optimal
payo®. The globally optimal wholesale price and pro¯ts are given by
8
2 (1¡¯)
>
>
w¤ = w
¹I ; ¦¤ = (a¡bc)
>
8b(1¡¯¡¯°)
>
>
2
>
>
¤ =w
¤ = (a¡bc) (1+®)
>
w
¹
;
¦
III
>
8b(1+®+®°)
>
>
>
(a¡bc)2 (1¡¯)°
>
>
w¤ = w2 ; ¦¤ = b(1¡¯¡¯°+2°)
>
2
>
<
2

w¤ =

>
>
>
>
>
w¤ =
>
>
>
>
>
> w¤ =
>
>
>
>
>
: ¤

w =

(1+®)
w
¹III ; ¦¤ = (a¡bc)
8b(1+®+®°)
(a¡bc)2
w2 ; ¦¤ = 4b(1+°)
2 (1+®)
w
¹III ; ¦¤ = (a¡bc)
8b(1+®+®°)
(a¡bc)2
w
¹II ; ¦¤ = 4b(1+°)
2

if 0 < ¯ ·
if
if

1¡2°
1+°
1¡2°
1+°

if ¯ =
if ¯ =
if
if

1
1+°
1
1+°

1¡2°
1+°

<¯<
<¯<
1
1+°
1
1+°

<¯
<¯

and ® ¸ ¯

1
1+°
1
1+°

and ¯ · ® < ®
¹

and ® ¸ maxf¹
®; ¯g

°¡1
1+°
and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g
< 1 and ¯ · ® < °¡1
1+°
< 1 and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g

and ¯ · ® <

(A10)

2

¡8¯°
where ®
¹ = (1¡¯¡¯°¡2°)
. It is straightforward to calculate the retailer's utility and pro¯ts,
8° 2 ¡(1¡¯¡¯°¡2°)2
given equations (A10) and (2.12). Furthermore, the retail price equals the channel-pro¯t maximiz1
ing retail price p = p¤ = a+bc
2b in the ¯fth and seventh cases in equation (A10), i.e., ¯ ¸ 1+° and
2

(a¡bc) °
¤
¤
® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g. In both cases the retailer's utility and pro¯t are given by ¼ = u = 4b(1+°) .
Since inequity always brings disutility to a fair-minded retailer as in equation (2.2), channel utility
is always no greater than channel pro¯t. When the channel pro¯t is maximized with w¤ = w2
1
1
¤
for ¯ = 1+°
and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
¹II for 1+°
< ¯ < 1 and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g and with w = w
1+° ; ¯g,
the channel utility, Uc = ¦ + u, is equal to channel pro¯t since the retailer will set retail price at
1
and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
p = w +°(w ¡c). The channel utility is therefore also maximized for ¯ ¸ 1+°
1+° ; ¯g.

Technical Appendix B
Proof for Proposition 3
Since the retailer makes decisions solely based on wholesale price w, the retailer's decisions are
still given by

p(w) =

8
>
p¹2 =
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:

a+bw
2b

¡

¯°(w¡c)
2(1¡¯)

p0 = w + °(w ¡ c)

p¹1 =

a+bw
2b

+

®°(w¡c)
2(1+®)

if w · w2
if w2 < w · w1

(B1)

if w > w1

which is same as equation (2.12).
1
Proposition 1 shows that the players will choose the channel-coordinating actions for ¯ ¸ 1+°
and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g when only the retailer cares about fairness, i.e., ®0 = ¯0 = 0. More speci¯cally, the manufacturer will choose w = w2 =

a¡a¯¡¯b°c+2b°c
°¡1
1
b(1¡¯¡¯°+2°) for ¯ = 1+° and ® ¸ maxf 1+° ; ¯g and
¤
® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g, and the retailer will choose p = p .

1
choose w = w
¹II = a+bc+2b°c
2b(1+°) for ¯ > 1+° and
We will check whether the current wholesale price is still optimal for the manufacturer when the
manufacturer cares about fairness.

(a) ¯ =

1
1+°

When ¯ =

and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g.
1
1+°

and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g, the manufacturer will choose w = w2 in the scenario of

w · w2 if it does not care about fairness and the retailer will choose p = p¹2 =
22

a+bw
2b

¡

¯°(w¡c)
2(1¡¯)

as

shown in equation (2.12). At the point of w = w2 =

a¡a¯¡¯b°c+2b°c
b(1¡¯¡¯°+2°)

(a ¡ bc)(¹° ¡ 1)
¹(¹
p2 ¡ w) ¡ (w ¡ c) =
2b(1 + °)

½

=

a+bc+2b°c
2b(1+°) ,

> 0 if ¹° > 1
· 0 if ¹° · 1

we have
(B2)

Case 1. Acrimonious channel: ¹° > 1. In an acrimonious channel, the manufacturer's utility
is given by
U (w) = (w ¡ c)(a ¡ b¹
p2 ) ¡ ®0 [¹(¹
p2 ¡ w) ¡ (w ¡ c)](a ¡ b¹
p2 )

(B3)

and we have
8
dU
>
< dw =
>
: d2 U

dw2

(a¡bc)
2 (1 + ®0

+ ®0 ¹) > 0
(B4)

=0

Since w · w2 , the manufacturer will still choose w = w2 to maximize its utility if w2 provides it
with non-negative utility. Its utility by choosing w = w2 is given below
(a ¡ bc)2 (1 + ®0 ¡ ®0 ¹°)
U (w = w2 ) =
4b(1 + °)

(

¸ 0 if ®0 ·
< 0 if ®0 >

1
¹°¡1
1
¹°¡1

(B5)

Case 2. Harmonious channel: ¹° · 1. In a harmonious channel, the manufacturer's utility is
given by
p2 ¡ w)](a ¡ b¹
p2 )
U (w) = (w ¡ c)(a ¡ b¹
p2 ) ¡ ¯0 [(w ¡ c) ¡ ¹(¹

(B6)

and we have
8
dU
>
< dw =
>
: d2 U

dw2

(a¡bc)
2 (1 ¡ ¯0

¡ ¯0 ¹)

(B7)

=0

Since w · w2 , the manufacturer will choose w as follows
w=

(

w2
< w2

if ¯0 ·
if ¯0 >

1
1+¹
1
1+¹

(B8)

and its utility is given by
U (w = w2 ) =

8
2
< (a¡bc) (1¡¯0 +¯0 ¹°)
:>

4b(1+°)
(a¡bc)2 (1¡¯0 +¯0 ¹°)
4b(1+°)

if ¯0 ·
if ¯0 >

1
1+¹
1
1+¹

(B9)

1
Since w = w2 is a corner solution for w · w2 when ¯ = 1+°
and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g, we also
need to check whether w = w2 is a stable solution within the w2 < w · w1 regime. When the
manufacturer chooses a close to w2 wholesale price in the scenario of w2 < w · w1 , the retailer will
choose p = p0 = w+°(w¡c) as shown in equation (B1). At the point of w = w2 = a¡a¯¡¯b°c+2b°c
b(1¡¯¡¯°+2°) =
a+bc+2b°c
2b(1+°) ,

we have
¹(p0 ¡ w2 ) ¡ (w2 ¡ c) = (¹° ¡ 1)(w2 ¡ c)
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½

> 0 if ¹° > 1
· 0 if ¹° · 1

(B10)

0

Case 1 . Acrimonious channel: ¹° > 1. In an acrimonious channel, the manufacturer's utility
is given by
U (w) = (w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp0 ) ¡ ®0 (¹° ¡ 1)(w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp0 )
and we have

(B11)

8
dU
>
< dw = (1 + ®0 ¡ ®0 ¹°)(a + bc ¡ 2bw ¡ 2b°w + 2b°c)

(B12)

>
: d2 U = ¡2b(1 + °)(1 + ® ¡ ® ¹°)
0
0
dw2

Since w2 < w · w1 , the manufacturer will choose w as follows
w=
and its utility is given by
U (w = w2 ) =
0

(

w2
> w2

if ®0 ·
if ®0 >

8
2
< (a¡bc) (1+®0 ¡®0 ¹°)
:>

1
¹°¡1
1
¹°¡1

4b(1+°)
(a¡bc)2 (1+®0 ¡®0 ¹°)
4b(1+°)

(B13)

if ®0 ·
if ®0 >

1
¹°¡1
1
¹°¡1

(B14)

Case 2 . Harmonious channel: ¹° · 1. In a harmonious channel, the manufacturer's utility is
given by
U (w) = (w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp0 ) ¡ ¯0 [(w ¡ c) ¡ ¹(p0 ¡ w)](a ¡ bp0 )
and we have

(B15)

8
dU
>
< dw = (1 ¡ ¯0 + ¯0 ¹°)(a + bc ¡ 2bw ¡ 2b°w + 2b°c)

(B16)

>
: d2 U = ¡2b(1 + °)(1 ¡ ¯ + ¯ ¹°) < 0
0
0
dw2

Since w2 < w · w1 , the manufacturer will choose w = w2 and its utility is given by
U=
0

(a ¡ bc)2 (1 ¡ ¯0 + ¯0 ¹°)
>0
4b(1 + °)

(B17)

0

From Cases 1; 2 and Cases 1 ; 2 , we could have the following conclusion for ¯ =
® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g.
(i). If ¹° ¡ 1 > 0, then
8
>
w¤ = w2 ; p = p¤ ; U ¤ =
>
>
<

U¤ =

c
>
>
>
: w¤ > w ; p > p¤ ; U ¤ >
2

(a¡bc)2 (1+®0 ¡®0 ¹°)
;
4b(1+°)
(a¡bc)2 (1+°+®0 ¡®0 ¹°)
4b(1+°)
(a¡bc)2 (1+®0 ¡®0 ¹°)
4b(1+°)

(ii). If ¹° ¡ 1 = 0, then

w¤ = w2 ; p = p¤ ; U ¤ =
(iii). If ¹° ¡ 1 < 0, then

8
¤
¤
¤
>
>
> w = w2 ; p = p ; U =
<

U¤ =

c
>
>
>
: w¤ < w ; p = p¤ ; U ¤ >
2

if ®0 ·
if ®0 >

1
¹°¡1
1
¹°¡1

:

(a ¡ bc)2
(a ¡ bc)2
; Uc¤ =
:
4b(1 + °)
4b

(a¡bc)2 (1¡¯0 +¯0 ¹°)
;
4b(1+°)
(a¡bc)2 (1+°¡¯0 +¯0 ¹°)
4b(1+°)
(a¡bc)2 (1¡¯0 +¯0 ¹°)
4b(1+°)
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if ¯0 ·
if ¯0 >

1
1+¹
1
1+¹

1
1+°

and

(B18)

(B19)

:

(B20)

(b) ¯ >

1
1+°

and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g.

1
When ¯ > 1+°
and ® ¸ maxf °¡1
¹II = a+bc+2b°c
1+° ; ¯g, the manufacturer will choose w = w
2b(1+°) in the
scenario of w2 < w · w1 if it does not care about fairness and the retailer will choose p = p0 =
w + °(w ¡ c) as shown in equation (2.12). At the point of w = w
¹II = a+bc+2b°c
2b(1+°) , we have

¹(p0 ¡ w) ¡ (w ¡ c) = (¹° ¡ 1)(w ¡ c)

½

> 0 if ¹° > 1
· 0 if ¹° · 1

(B21)

Case 1. Acrimonious channel: ¹° > 1. In an acrimonious channel, the manufacturer's utility
is given by
U (w) = (w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp0 ) ¡ ®0 (¹° ¡ 1)(w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp0 )

(B22)

and we have
8
dU
>
< dw = (1 + ®0 ¡ ®0 ¹°)(a + bc ¡ 2bw ¡ 2b°w + 2b°c)

(B23)

>
: d2 U = ¡2b(1 + °)(1 + ® ¡ ® ¹°)
0
0
dw2

¹II provides it with non-negative utility. Its utility
The manufacturer will still choose w = w
¹II if w
by choosing w = w
¹II is given below
(a ¡ bc)2 (1 + ®0 ¡ ®0 ¹°)
U (w = w
¹II ) =
4b(1 + °)

(

¸ 0 if ®0 ·
< 0 if ®0 >

1
¹°¡1
1
¹°¡1

(B24)

Case 2. Harmonious channel: ¹° · 1. In a harmonious channel, the manufacturer's utility is
given by
U (w) = (w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp0 ) ¡ ¯0 (1 ¡ ¹°)(w ¡ c)(a ¡ bp0 )

(B25)

and we have
8
dU
>
< dw = (1 ¡ ¯0 + ¯0 ¹°)(a + bc ¡ 2bw ¡ 2b°w + 2b°c)

(B26)

>
: d2 U = ¡2b(1 = °)(1 ¡ ¯ + ¯ ¹°) < 0
0
0
dw2

The manufacturer's utility by choosing w = w
¹II is given by
U (w = w
¹II ) =

(a ¡ bc)2 (1 ¡ ¯0 + ¯0 ¹°)
>0
4b(1 + °)

(B27)

From Cases 1 and 2 above, we could have the following conclusion for ¯ >
maxf °¡1
1+° ; ¯g.
(i). If ¹° ¡ 1 > 0, then
8
¤
>
¹II ; p = p¤ ; U ¤ =
>
>w = w
<

U¤ =

c
>
>
>
: w¤ 6
¤
=w
¹II ; p 6
= p ; U¤ >

(a¡bc)2 (1+®0 ¡®0 ¹°)
;
4b(1+°)
(a¡bc)2 (1+°+®0 ¡®0 ¹°)
4b(1+°)
(a¡bc)2 (1+®0 ¡®0 ¹°)
4b(1+°)
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if ®0 ·
if ®0 >

1
¹°¡1
1
¹°¡1

:

1
1+°

and ® ¸

(B28)

(ii). If ¹° ¡ 1 = 0, then
(a ¡ bc)2
(a ¡ bc)2
; Uc¤ =
:
4b(1 + °)
4b

(B29)

(a ¡ bc)2 (1 ¡ ¯0 + ¯0 ¹°)
(a ¡ bc)2
; Uc¤ =
:
4b(1 + °)
4b

(B30)

w¤ = w
¹II ; p = p¤ ; U ¤ =
(iii). If ¹° ¡ 1 < 0, then
¹II ; p = p¤ ; U ¤ =
w¤ = w

We can see that manufacturer's concern for fairness will not a®ect the maximization of either
channel pro¯t or channel utility, unless the manufacturer is very averse to its own disadvantageous
inequality. This leads to Proposition 3.
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